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The value of work and the future of the 
Left 
Campbell Jones
IMPORTANT SIGNS IN recent years suggest that work may be returning to centre stage in politics. Of course, work has always been political in the broad sense, so the reality of this 
situation is better depicted as a challenge to the way that work 
has been effectively depoliticised in many contexts. This is a 
question, then, of the different ways that work is understood, 
represented, and spoken about, both in political movements and 
in the organs of politics, most obviously in parliamentary poli-
tics, the unions of organised labour, and the associations of the 
employers of labour.
In this sense, the Future of Work Commission estab-
lished by the Labour Party of New Zealand is to be praised for 
its effort to place work back on the political agenda. The Labour 
Party has a proud history representing working people as well as 
formally representing workers’ movements in the parliamentary 
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sphere. The Future of Work Commission could therefore play an 
important role in returning work to the space of political contes-
tation and as an object around which political organisation can 
take place. What happens when work appears on the political 
stage, however, is very much an open question.
This paper arises from a request to report to the Future 
of Work Commission on the question of the value of work in the 
past, present, and future politics of the Left.1 This task is com-
plicated, however, by the complexity of the meaning of the terms 
Left and Right. As is well known, these terms have always been 
contested, and entered something of a crisis in the 1980s when 
the word ‘Left’ continued to be used but was increasingly emp-
tied of content. Today, however, the Left is again in the process 
of reinventing itself. This reinvention presents the task, then, of 
laying the foundations not only of a new politics of work but also 
a meaningful concept of the political Left. It is only when we are 
clear about the meanings of Left and Right that we can be clear 
about the very different kinds of politics that will result from tak-
ing a Left position on work.
This paper therefore seeks to clarify what a Left politics 
of work might look like today. This requires in the first place an 
analysis of the respective value of work to the political Left and 
1 I would like to thank Grant Robertson for the invitation to write this paper and 
for his efforts in establishing the Future of Work Commission. Earlier versions 
of elements of this paper were presented at the Rosa Luxemburg School for Poli-
tics and Critique (Ohrid, Macedonia, June 24-27, 2016); the Social Movements, 
Resistance and Social Change III conference (Wellington, September 1-3, 2016); 
the Feminism and Finance seminar (University of Auckland, December 19, 2016) 
and the Sociology discipline seminar series (University of Auckland, May 10, 
2017). Thanks to all participants for their valuable contributions and comments. 
Thanks to Catherine Cumming, Nathalie Jaques, Anna-Maria Murtola, and Ste-
phen Turner for feedback on a full version paper and many important provoca-
tions. Thanks also to students in my ‘Work and Life’ and ‘Fantasies of Finance’ 
courses at the University of Auckland who have discussed and helped me refine 
these ideas over the past two years. Thanks finally to two anonymous reviewers 
for useful comments and to Dylan Taylor and the editorial team at Counterfu-
tures for their insightful reading and many valuable suggestions. Any failings 
that remain are my own.
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Right, to which end I argue that what distinguishes the Left and 
the Right regarding the value of work is not simply the quantity 
of value or dignity that is attributed to work. Rather, Left and 
Right depart in a fundamental ontological confrontation regard-
ing the nature of what work is and the existence of the bodies 
from which work issues. This analysis therefore raises deeper 
questions regarding the very distinction between the Left and 
the Right. Much of what is identified as the parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary Left has in recent years taken over the con-
cepts and the ontological coordinates of the Right. I take as my 
target the definition of work prevalent on the Right, what I call 
the ‘vulgar concept of work’. Given the strong and distinctive past 
of Left politics of work and the urgent strategic opportunity for 
political organisation around work, I argue for the importance for 
the contemporary Left of a renewed politics of work grounded on 
its own distinctive conception of work and its own claims for the 
rights of working people. A Left politics of work demands a radi-
cal reconsideration of what counts as work and the rewards that 
result from various activities considered as work. 
The paper is divided into three parts. The first part 
assesses the value of work on the Left and the Right, arguing 
against the notion that the Left values work and workers more 
highly than the Right. This grounds the analysis in the second 
part of what it is about work that is valued by the Left and the 
Right. What emerges in this analysis is that the Left and Right 
part ways not in the value or dignity attributed to work. Rather, 
they maintain radically different conceptions of what constitutes 
work. On the basis of this distinction, the third part of the paper 
turns to what divides the Left and the Right as such. Because a 
key part of the future of the Left, I argue, arises from a specific 
conception of work and the politics that arises from this, I con-
clude by advancing five positions for a Left politics of work.
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The value of work
At first glance it is rather obvious that the Left is marked by a 
defence and celebration of work and the working class. This is 
clear from the history of the modern Left: from the sans-culottes of 
the French Revolution, the striking workers of the Scottish Insur-
rection of 1820, the direct manifestation of the working class and 
its power with the rise of Chartism in the 1830s and the revolu-
tions across Europe of 1848 to the Paris Commune of 1871. This 
valuing of work and workers is equally central to the formal work-
ers’ associations of the late nineteenth century, in the rise of trade 
unions and organisations such as the founding in 1863 of the 
German Workers’ Association, later to become the Social Demo-
cratic Workers’ Party of Germany, and the founding in 1864 of 
the International Working Men’s Association (also known as the 
First International). Similarly, the valuation of work and work-
ers was central to the rise of other workers’ parties that formed 
out of these earlier social movements and institutions such as the 
British Labour party, established in 1900, and the New Zealand 
Labour Party, established in 1916.
The historical valuation of work on the Left can be clearly 
seen in Left literature and art. Hence the power of the image of the 
hammer and sickle to symbolise industrial and farm work, and the 
celebration of work and workers on International Workers’ Day 
(usually the first of May), instituted by the Second Internation-
al from 1886. These symbols, along with the great novels, films, 
and music celebrating work and workers, are as important for the 
modern Left as its formal institutions and theoretical works. 
The place of work and workers on the modern Left is 
also clearly signalled by the historical significance and changing 
stakes of the strike. The capacity for the organised withdrawal or 
refusal of work developed in modern politics into one of the key 
tactics for the symbolic and financial revaluation of work. Hence 
the success of the modern Left in making demands over working 
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conditions through strikes, whether they were organised within 
a particular workplace, a sector of the economy, a general strike, 
or, for example, the women’s strike to demand recognition of sys-
tematically undervalued work.
The value of work on the Left can furthermore be seen in 
the place of work in Left theory throughout the twentieth centu-
ry.2 Marx demonstrated the centrality of work to the development 
of capitalism and how, when organised by capital, work involves 
expanding and deepening misery for many in the process of pro-
ducing great wealth for the capitalist class. The ‘free association 
of producers’ that he called for is an invocation to recognise and 
value not only the productive powers of workers but further, 
their capacity through self-organisation to organise their work 
in spite of and outside capitalist command and their capacity 
through political organisation to intervene so as to change their 
situation. Later Left thinkers have emphasised the fundamen-
tal place of work in Marx and Marxist politics.3
2 There is a vast literature in Left theory that maintains, in various ways, the cen-
trality of work both in daily life under capitalism and for the prospects of politi-
cal organisation. Rather than seeking to provide an exhaustive history of these 
important efforts, what is most important first of all is to note the persistence 
of Left claims over work. These often appear in changed historical conditions, 
in relation to changes in the world of work, asserting that despite these chang-
es, work is still pivotal experientially and politically. For moments across this 
vast literature over recent years see, for example, Harry Braverman, Labor and 
Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, second edi-
tion (New York: Monthly Review, 1988); André Gorz, Farewell to the Working 
Class, trans. Michael Sonenscher (London: Pluto, 1982); Antonio Negri, “Workers’ 
party against work,” in Books For Burning: Between Civil War and Democracy in 
1970s Italy, trans. Arianna Bove et al. (London: Verso, 2005); Geoffrey Key, “Why 
Labour is the Starting Point of Capital,” in Value: The Representation of Labour 
in Capitalism, ed. Diane Elson (London: Verso, 1979); and Ricardo Antunes, The 
Meanings of Work: Essays on the Affirmation and Negation of Work, trans. Eliza-
beth Molinari (Chicago, IL: Haymarket, 2013).
3 Georg Lukács, for example, writes: ‘labour is particularly from a genetic point 
of view the starting point of the humanization of man, for the extension of his 
abilities, among which self-mastery is something that can never be forgotten. It is 
moreover for a very long space of time the only area of this development, and all 
other forms of human activity which are linked to various values can only appear 
in an independent form when labour itself has already reached a relatively high 
level’. In Georg Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being 2. Marx, trans David Fern-
bach (London: Merlin, 1978), 80.
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On the face of it, this appears as simply an elevation 
of the valuation of work and workers. This is complicated con-
siderably by the question of the particular types of work that 
claim pride of place in this ostensible valuation of work. While 
in some of its forms the Left sought to elevate in status the work 
of all, there was equally a tendency to elevate particular types 
of work and worker, generally white male industrial workers. 
This resulted not so much from a generalised valuation of work 
on the Left but rather a valuing of those already most privi-
leged by industrial capitalism and considered most amenable to 
political organisation.
The particularism of this vision of who was to be fully 
included within the celebrated working class bears one of the 
most damning indictments of Left representation and politi-
cal organisation of workers. At the same time, as I will argue 
below, the lessons that can be learned from this limited notion 
of who counts as a worker, and of what is considered work, are 
the grounds on which the future of the Left can build an analysis 
and politics of work. We see here a theme to which I will return: 
the dangers of Left representation of work assuming a received 
idea of what work is, what work is most valuable, and whose 
work is most valuable.
I will return to these questions in the next part of the 
paper, but first it is important to clarify the value of work on the 
Right. In a certain sense, the modern Left and Right are both 
united in the positive valuation of work. Whatever is said, in 
practice both take work as the ultimate source of value and of 
social development and improvement, and in practice both know 
that labour is the source of profits, even if they draw very differ-
ent conclusions from that realisation.
The valuation of work on the Right can be seen in many 
places. Of course, it is only in a roundabout way that the Right 
celebrates the class of people from which work issues. In a per-
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verse twist, the Right praises the value and dignity of working. 
Work is taken by the Right as the justification of reward and 
therefore as one of the key grounds for the justification of ine-
quality. What is then advocated is not the equality of people but 
rather the equivalence between work and reward. Rather than 
explaining reward in terms of unequal starting points or an 
economic process of the extraction of wealth from the working 
class, and trying to sidestep difficult questions about how social 
distribution is a contestable political position, the Right justi-
fies inequality through an imagined causal relation between 
work and effort. This is why work is a crucial ideological opera-
tor for the Right. 
With this in mind, it is not surprising that the politi-
cal parties of the Right in New Zealand praise work and work-
ing. This is a crucial part of the National Party’s strategy, which 
includes a campaign to get New Zealand working. The National 
Party itself claims to be ‘working for New Zealand’,4 and ‘work-
ing to build a better future for New Zealand’.5 National Party 
publicity states that it is ‘working to help families get ahead in 
a vibrant and growing economy’,6 and is ‘working hard to ensure 
our education system is working for all New Zealand children’.7 
This goes beyond publicity and is claimed as a core value: ‘The 
National Party has always valued enterprise, hard work and the 
rewards that go with success’.8
This ideological valuation of work runs throughout the 
pronouncements of the Right. This often features in discussions 
of productivity, in the inducement to create more output from 
work. Thus the importance of notions that ‘the long-term pros-
4 https://www.national.org.nz/history
5 https://www.national.org.nz/policies
6 https://www.national.org.nz/10_ways_national_is_helping_families_get_ahead
7 https://www.national.org.nz/policies 
8 https://www.national.org.nz/our-values
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perity of a country depends on productivity’, or that ‘a society can 
also raise incomes by working harder’.9 Valuation of work and, in 
particular, hard work rests behind former Prime Minister John 
Key’s defence of immigration policy on the grounds that New 
Zealand workers are lazy, drug addled, and ‘just can’t muster 
what is required to actually work’.10 Equally, in spite of the lack 
of evidence and notable objections, a principled valuing of work 
rests behind the current Prime Minister Bill English’s complaint 
that ‘two or three employers a week’ tell him that young New 
Zealand workers are drugged.11
This defence of hard work is not unique to the Right in 
New Zealand; indeed it finds its origins and ideological encourage-
ment elsewhere. Valuing hard work was a central rhetorical strat-
egy of the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David 
Cameron. His injunction to work was pivotal in his repeated attacks 
on the poor. He asserted that ‘if you can work, you should work and 
not live off the hard work of others’.12 In a magisterial reversal of 
the logic of the capitalist exploitation of labour and in blind conces-
sion to the legitimacy of what he called ‘the system’, he laid down 
the gauntlet: ‘And for that person intent on ripping off the system, 
we are saying—we will not let you live off the hard work of others’.13
9 Oliver Hartwich, Manifesto 2017: What the Next New Zealand Government Should 
Do (Wellington: The New Zealand Initiative, 2017), 24; Paul Conway, Achieving 
New Zealand’s Productivity Potential (research paper for, The New Zealand Ini-
tiative, 2016): 3.
10 http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/312562/immigrants-needed-due-to-nzers’ 
-work-ethic,-drug-use-pm
11 http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/89858196/bill-english-says-employers-
are-regularly-telling-him-that-kiwis-cant-pass-drug-tests
12 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/oct/08/david-cameron-speech-in-full
13 http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/05/society-government-
public. As Christian Fuchs summarises: ‘Cameronism is an ideology of hard 
labour: It argues that it works hard to manage the economy by fiscal auster-
ity, reducing public spending and cutting taxes and that it does all to advance 
the interests of hard working Britons by reducing their taxes, immigration and 
welfare abuse’ Christian Fuchs, “Neoliberalism in Britain: From Thatcherism to 
Cameronism,” Triple C: Communication, Capitalism, Critique, 14 (2016): 173.
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Numerous other examples could be offered to demon-
strate the historical valuation of work by the Right, from contem-
porary political parties and ideologists, back to Nazi use of the 
nineteenth-century slogan ‘work makes you free’, or the Vichy 
regime’s replacement of the value of ‘Liberty, Equality, Frater-
nity’ with ‘Work, Family, Homeland’. Perhaps most important 
is the function that work serves in political liberalism and capi-
talist economics. The driving impulse for Adam Smith was the 
means by which the productivity of labour can be increased rath-
er than the division of labour as such.14 Equally, John Locke was 
not unusual in the tradition of political liberalism in the great 
value that he placed on work, or in his idea that ‘We ought to look 
on it as a mark of goodness in God that he has put us in this life 
under a necessity of labour’.15
There are various reasons for the celebration of work by 
the Right, but at the heart of this matter is the fact that the Right 
is the political symbolisation of the interests of the class who live 
and grow rich from the work of other people. On the Right, even the 
act of profiting from the work of others is represented as work itself 
(it’s not easy collecting rent, it’s hard work running a business…). 
This is accompanied by the injunction that all others must work, 
must always work, and must forever improve themselves so as to 
be more productive, more reliable, and available on demand. On the 
question of the value of work, the Right will always have the upper 
hand. This is because the Right is the representation of class inter-
ests of those who benefit from the exploitation of the work of others.
14 The ‘improvement of the productive powers of labour’ is both the conceptual and 
the literal starting point of Smith’s economics. See Adam Smith, The Wealth of 
Nations, Books I-III, ed. Andrew Skinner (London: Penguin, 1986), 109ff.
15 John Locke “Labour,” in Political Writings, ed. David Wooton (Indianapolis, IL: 
Hackett, 1993), 440. On the multiple meanings of work in Locke and the con-
tradictions in his ‘labour theory of property’ see Campbell Jones “The Meanings 
of Work in John Locke,” in History of Economic Rationalities, eds. Jakob Bek-
Thomsen, Christian Olaf Christiansen, Stefan Gaarsmand Jacobsen and Mikkel 
Thorup (Dordrect: Springer, 2017), 51-62.
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This brief sketch of the value of work on the Left and 
the Right illuminates how the modern Left and Right are, within 
specific limits, united in their valuation of work. This valuation of 
work has, of course, not always been the case, and this increased 
valuation of work across the political spectrum is a distinctly 
modern phenomenon, one that clearly accompanies the rise of 
capitalism. As historians such as E P Thompson have shown, the 
effort to induce people to work, and the broader process of the 
construction of the working class, was a terribly difficult project, 
encountering resistance and refusal at every step.16 This survey 
of the modern valuation of work on the Left and the Right was a 
necessary step in the movement towards a deeper question. It will 
be shown, in what follows, that the Left and the Right depart on 
the questions of why they value work and what is valued in work.
Why and what the Left and Right value in work
Work is valued for a vast number of reasons. For the one who 
works, there can be a sense of achievement in seeing the results of 
the externalisation of human effort in material objects and social 
forms. Work involves the capacity to be involved with creating 
great things, whether this is a physical construction, the building 
of an institution, or the pleasure in witnessing the affective state of 
those for whom we care. Even if the desire to work is far from natu-
ral, work is widely claimed to have value for all: in working one 
sees the results of one’s actions and in doing so constructs oneself.17
16 Edward Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: Penguin, 
1968).
17 This valuation of work runs across modern thought but is outlined perhaps most 
elegantly and with the richest significance in chapter four of Hegel’s Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit, which develops and condenses his earlier lectures in Jena. See Georg 
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977); Georg Hegel, System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit, 
trans. H.S. Harris and T. M. Knox (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1979).
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At the level of the community, work provides the means 
of subsistence, not only for those who work, but for others unable 
to work or whom the community decides to exempt from work 
because of age, illness, injury, or any other reason. Work pro-
vides not only continued existence, it also expands the capacities 
of health, food production, transportation, communication, social 
relations, education, and recreation. The virtues of work are 
therefore taught to all, for its results do not just benefit the indi-
vidual who works, but can also benefit the community at large. 
For these very real reasons, in modern life the idea of 
being opposed to work as such, or seeking to reduce or limit work, 
becomes all but unthinkable. In the extreme: ‘The modern age 
has carried with it a theoretical glorification of labor and has 
resulted in a factual transformation of the whole of society into a 
laboring society’.18 This was never fully achieved, and has always 
met resistance; hence the profound and relentless effort to drum 
a ‘work ethic’ into human bodies not immediately inclined in 
this direction, whether this comes from the pulpit, the teacher, 
government officials, the Work and Income office, or the televi-
sion.19 There has always been a demonisation of those unable or 
unwilling to work, or unwilling to work as hard and as long as 
possible, which has taken on a pronounced televisual and online 
presence in recent years.20 It is vital to stress that this contem-
porary demonisation of the poor is strictly continuous with the 
relentless modern demand for ever more work, ever harder work, 
and ever more productive work that is found in Protestantism, 
in political liberalism and classical political economy, and in con-
temporary capitalist economics.
18 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1958), 4.
19 The classic sociological analysis of the tactics of the efforts at moral inducement 
to work is provided by Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capital-
ism, trans. Talcott Parson (London: Routledge, 1930).
20 See Owen Jones, Chavs: The Demonisation of the Working Class (London: Verso, 
2016).
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This blanket valuation of work is interrupted, however, 
by the vast diversity of work, and the reality that so many types 
of work patently fail to deliver the self-actualisation promised by 
the proponents of work. Forms of work that are physically debili-
tating or dangerous might fail in this test, as do the increasing 
number of jobs that are today precarious in continuity or avail-
ability. So a hierarchy of types of work emerges: from the most 
satisfying and valued we descend through to dangerous and pre-
carious work and the boring and pointless work that David Grae-
ber identifies as ‘bullshit jobs’.21
There are different responses to this multiplicity of 
work. One approach involves efforts to eliminate the worst, most 
dangerous, and unpleasant types of work; to modify or improve 
the design of work; to introduce safety standards and require-
ments for break periods; and to eliminate certain types of work 
contracts through, for instance, the criminalisation of zero-hour 
contracts.22 These kinds of intervention cut off the tail end of the 
most undesirable jobs. But it is hard to justify the inherent value 
and dignity of work to the worker when so much of the work on 
offer is debilitating, degrading, or in direct conflict with the sto-
ries a society tells itself about the value and dignity of citizens. 
The diversity of work and working conditions is often justified 
by the idea that progress is possible, that one can move upward 
from a bad job to a less bad job. This idea of upward mobility 
is sharply contradicted by the evidence regarding employment 
mobility; further, rather than improving work as such, employ-
ment mobility typically means that different workers are shuffled 
between the same set of positions. Yet this idea has a remarkable 
21 David Graeber, Bullshit Jobs: A Theory (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
forthcoming).
22 In Aotearoa New Zealand, zero-hour contracts were legislated against by the 
Employment Standards Legislation Bill of 2016 following union campaigns call-
ing for their abolition.
149Jones: The value of work and the future of the Left 
endurance precisely because of the way it plays on the idea of a 
meritocratic relation between ability, effort, and reward.23
While the positions assumed as to the supposed diversi-
ty of jobs and ideas of mobility and meritocracy show some signif-
icant differences between the Left and the Right, beyond these a 
much deeper set of differences regarding what is valued in work 
now come into view. In a certain sense, everyone benefits from 
the work of others. The labours of those who came before us and 
of those we work alongside today provide significant material 
and social benefits. This accumulation and socialisation of labour 
has informed the modern Left’s valuation of work, a valuation 
grounded in the recognition that the ongoing work of everyone 
produces the possibility of a better life for all.
The obvious problem is that the benefits of the work 
of others are not equally distributed. This has always been the 
case, but is particularly so when the vast majority earn their 
continued existence and right to social participation by selling 
their wage labour to another group that accrues wealth by pur-
chasing wage labour and setting it to work. While the employ-
er seeks effort and output, from the standpoint of those who 
sell their labour-power, working involves offering more than 
the capacity to exert effort. This is the case with all forms of 
work, although it is accelerated in contemporary forms of work 
that rely on one ‘being oneself’ or displaying social and affec-
tive capacities in order to do one’s work. Work always brings 
with it the worker. Despite our best efforts to remain alien to 
the work we do, the basic problem remains that the capacity to 
work always issues from a real, living human being, and this 
23 See Michael Young, The Rise of the Meritocracy, 1870-2033  (London: Pelican, 
1958). For contemporary cases against ‘meritocracy’ see James Bloodworth, The 
Myth of Meritocracy (London: Biteback, 2016) and Jo Littler Against Meritocracy: 
Culture, Power and Myths of Mobility (Oxford: Routledge, 2017). See also Robert 
H. Frank, Success and Luck: Good Fortune and the Myth of Meritocracy (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).
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requires the conditions that enabled the production and repro-
duction of that human being.
Meaningful Left politics has always valued something 
more in work than its material results. Hence the Left valuation 
of the entire person behind the work for their innate humanity. 
This is the ground for the Left insistence on the relative equality 
of every worker, despite, or in direct disregard for, the utility of 
that labour for the capitalist. This is the socialist demand that ‘no 
inequality of individual powers can serve as a basis for inequal-
ity of individual rewards’.24 This is the often-forgotten reasoning 
behind the ancient idea that, because talents are differently dis-
tributed, it falls on those most capable to contribute the most. 
This is expressed in the modern Left premise of shared access 
to the wealth produced in common. It is what rests behind the 
principle: ‘From each according to their ability, to each accord-
ing to their needs’.25
At the starkest, then, the Right values work for what it 
produces, for productivity. The Left also values productivity but 
on the Left the emphasis is on the social benefits of increased 
productive capacities. Marx could not help but celebrate—at 
times excessively—the benefits of the increasing productivity 
of work. This emphasis led him, at times, to focus his analy-
sis too narrowly on those forms of work in which productivity 
could be palpably increased, while underplaying other forms of 
labour where such changes in productivity were not so easily 
obtained.26 Thomas Piketty equally emphasises the benefits of 
24 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What is Property?, trans. Donald Kelly and Bonnie G. 
Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 102.
25 Karl Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Programme,” in The First International and 
After: Political Writings, Volume Three (London: Verso, 2010), 347.
26 On this important dynamic of the differential prospect for increasing the produc-
tivity of labour in different forms of work framed from the side of capitalist eco-
nomics, see William Baumol et al. The Cost Disease: Why Computers Get Cheaper 
and Health Care Doesn’t (New York: Yale University Press, 2012).
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productivity and economic growth more generally, noting the 
broad social benefits of those moments in the history of capital-
ism where the rate of growth could approximate or exceed the 
rate of return on capital.27
But beyond a shared valuing of constantly increasing 
productivity, the Right, as the ideological and material rep-
resentation of those who benefit from the work of others, find 
that the increasing productivity of labour, when other limits 
are reached, is the principal means by which increasing rates 
of return on capital can be achieved. By contrast, the Left has 
sensed that the increasing productivity of labour can be the 
grounds, not for an increase in the rate of profit, but rather for 
the reduction or elimination of either certain types of work or 
of work as such. 
The idea of the reduction of work as such has always 
been met with extreme hostility from the Right, and has been 
attacked in wildly diverse ways. We can see this in the celebra-
tion of work in its own right, or the idea that those who are not 
labouring under the command of others are somehow inclined 
to a wasteful or socially catastrophic form of idling. Against this 
have been various Left appeals to the reduction of the working 
day, the virtues of freedom from work, the celebration of ‘the 
right to be lazy’, and essays ‘in praise of idleness’.28
These explicit appeals reflect the variety of concrete prac-
tices of refusal of work. Sociologists have extensively documented 
and taxonomised the variety of ways in which and reasons for 
27 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer 
(Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).
28 See, for example, Paul Lafargue, The Right to be Lazy (New York: AK Press, 
2011); Bertrand Russell, In Praise of Idleness and other Essays (Oxford: Rout-
ledge, 2004); Tom Hodgkinson, How to Be Idle (London: Penguin, 2005). 
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which people refuse or resist work.29 The Left has a strong and 
proud history of the refusal of work, of demands against work in 
order to reduce it. This involves not simply the modification of 
work but its limitation. Not better work, but less work, a demand 
to have ‘hours for what we will’. Often this reflects the demand to 
turn technological development away from the extension of work 
and towards the reduction of work and the creation of spaces for 
leisure.30 This can be seen in the practical politics of the restric-
tion of the working day, of paid work or of work in general, and in 
recent calls for an anti-work politics and a ‘world without work’.31 
The distinctiveness of a Left position on work is, then, 
not to be found in the value placed on work as such. It should 
be remembered that Marx did not unequivocally celebrate work, 
as is often claimed, but rather grudgingly conceded work as a 
necessity, a practice that opens the realm of freedom, and above 
all the freedom of others. ‘The true realm of freedom, the devel-
opment of human powers as an end in itself’, he wrote, lies 
beyond necessity, and for this, ‘The reduction of the working day 
is the basic prerequisite’.32
The Left, then, values something very different in work. 
So far, however, we have been treating work in a rather obvious 
way, largely in terms of the commonsensical notion of work as 
pertaining to those activities recognised in paid employment. It is 
29 For instance, Stephen Ackroyd and Paul Thompson, Organizational Misbehav-
iour (London: Sage, 1999); Peter Fleming, Resisting Work: The Corporatisation of 
Life and its Discontents (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2015); David 
Frayne, The Refusal of Work: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to Work (Lon-
don: Zed, 2015).
30 See, for example, André Gorz, Paths to Paradise: On the Liberation from Work, 
trans. Malcolm Imrie (London: Pluto, 1985); André Gorz, Critique of Economic 
Reason, trans. Gillian Handyside and Chris Turner (London: Verso, 1989).
31 Recent examples include Kathi Weeks, The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marx-
ism, Antiwork Politics and Postwork Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2011); Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, Inventing the Future: Postcapital-
ism and a World Without Work (London: Verso, 2015).
32 Karl Marx, Capital: Volume Three (London: Penguin, 1990), 959.
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important to stress the Left’s insistence that such activities nec-
essarily involve the worker, and that the worker as the bearer of 
labour-power should be valued in themself. But the designation of 
what is valued in work, and valued in the worker, can be extended 
further to encompass the very definition of work itself. This is why 
the most profound challenge of the Future of Work Commission 
rests in the demand: ‘it is time to reconsider what work is’.33
This is not simply a timely challenge that responds to 
the changes brought about by the computerisation or automa-
tion of certain types of work. These are widespread platitudes. 
The Left has always had a different consideration of what work 
is and has always contested the narrowness and shallowness of 
the conception of work proposed by the Right. There are always 
changes in the way work is organised, in the superficial sense 
that the same thing can be organised in many different ways. But 
more important, and this is a clue as to the future of the Left, is 
the Left’s ability to see in work something fundamentally differ-
ent from what is registered by the Right. The Left and the Right, 
in short, do not so much dispute the value of an agreed-upon 
thing. Except when they take over the categories of the other 
side, which can happen in either direction, the Left and the Right 
disagree over the nature of the thing itself. This is an ontological 
dispute over the nature of work, what work is, and what should 
be considered work.
When the grounds of this dispute are forgotten there is a 
risk of lapsing into what I call the ‘vulgar concept of work’. This 
concept is vulgar, not in the sense of being crass or sordid, but 
rather in that it takes what seems the most obvious form of work 
to reflect work as such. In this conception, work is understood to 
be the intentional, instrumental, purposive activity of a largely 
isolated individual, generally in return for money. The vulgar 
33 Future of Work Commission, The Future of Work, 37.
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concept of work is found throughout liberal political philosophy 
and classical political economy, and is central in contemporary 
capitalist economics. And even if it is far from completely stable 
in these traditions, this vulgar concept of work has been almost 
universally taken over as reflecting work as such.
It is not that, with the rise of flexible work, care work, 
and automation, this vulgar concept of work no longer reflects 
the realities of work today. It has never adequately reflected the 
reality of work, which is fundamentally social, enabled by a com-
munity, past and present, and, in particular, by the vast and 
generally unpaid work of producing and reproducing workers.34 
In any act of working, work draws on a vast and dispersed set 
of capacities that have developed over ‘thousands of centuries’.35 
Production, in short, has always been ‘production from the com-
mon, in common, of the common’.36
The Left emphasises that work is always social and does 
not issue from an isolated self-possessing and self-sufficient indi-
vidual. While this is often forgotten, or is thought to be a philo-
sophical whimsy or part of an abstract ‘critique of the subject’, 
the Left has always had a different idea not simply of the value 
of work but of what is valued in work and why. This involves a 
distinct conception of what a human being is, what society is, and 
what, ultimately, work is.
34 Silvia Federici, Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction and Feminist 
Struggle (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012); Marilyn Waring, Counting for Nothing: 
What Men Value and what Women are Worth (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1999).
35 Marx: ‘the capital-relation arises out of an economic soil that is the product of 
a long period of development. The existing productivity of labour, from which it 
proceeds as its basis, is a gift, not of nature, but of a history embracing thousands 
of centuries’. Karl Marx, Capital: Volume One (London: Penguin, 1990), 647.
36 Campbell Jones and Anna-Maria Murtola, “Entrepreneurship and expropria-
tion,” Organization, 19 (2012): 635.
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The future of the Left
In the first part of this paper I sought to establish that the prin-
cipal departure between the modern Left and Right over work 
is not reducible to the value of work. Both attribute value and 
dignity to work. The second part of the paper explored how the 
Left and Right diverge on the question of why work is valued and 
what in work is valued; significantly, they part ways on questions 
of what work is, and what is important about work and the peo-
ple that work. It is not that the Left and the Right hold different 
positions on a shared object; rather, the objects they understand 
as work are fundamentally different.
Politics always involves disagreement, and the effort to 
eradicate or manage disagreement is also a reduction of the pos-
sibility of politics.37 Politics is inevitably ontological: it involves 
claims about what is, and explicitly or implicitly conducts a dis-
course on being. Remembering that politics is ontological is crucial 
if we are to understand the political transformations that have 
taken place since the 1980s, in which institutionalised Left poli-
tics and its political organs increasingly took on the character and 
categories of the Right. Significant here is the institutional Left’s 
reorientation to the ontological coordinates of the Right. With this 
ontological reorientation it certainly became plausible to conclude 
that the Left and the Right were finally talking about the same 
thing. In this way two positions unite into one, converging around 
a ‘third way’ or an ‘extreme centre’ that simply does not recognise 
the conflicts of the past and takes politics to be the art of the pos-
sible, the balanced and smooth administration of ‘what works’.38
37 Jacques Rancière, On the Shores of Politics, trans. Liz Heron (London: Verso, 
1992); Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans. Julie Rose 
(Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota University Press, 2004).
38 Tariq Ali, Extreme Centre: A Warning (London: Verso, 2015); Campbell Jones and 
Shannon Walsh, “What is political organisation?” Economic and Social Research 
Aotearoa 2 (2017): 1-6.
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It is an important step, then, for the Left today to put 
work and the future of work back on the agenda. Because the 
Left has historically not held the same conception of work as the 
Right, by itself this is nowhere near enough. It would be a grave 
danger for the self-defined Left, and the political movements and 
parties traditionally associated with it, to continue assuming the 
categories and the definition of work set by the Right. When it 
does this, Left politics is reduced to merely repeating yesterdays’ 
slogans, but this time emptied of content. The Left, then, can eas-
ily pay lip-service as to whose side it is on, while the content of its 
politics, the objects around which it organises, and the course of 
action proposed are taken from the Right. The future of the Left 
requires recognising that it represents a world fundamentally 
different from that of the Right.
That politics arises from ontological disagreement is 
not a new idea. The history of the Left has always rested on 
the demands for the acknowledgement of the existence of those 
elements considered not to exist, or to have a minimal power of 
existence according to the Right. The development of the poli-
tics of the working class and its political organs, of the femi-
nist struggle and its symbolic representation, the claims for the 
equality of all bodies that work, involve a constant struggle to 
articulate demands for rights to social, political, and symbolic 
existence. This is a demand that one’s activity not be taken as 
reflective of nature but that action issues from wilful subjects 
who can withhold, refuse, and act differently, and because of 
this have the capacity to transform society.39
The modern Left crystallised during the French Revolu-
tion in the demands for the rights of existence of a Third Estate of 
‘commoners’. This call for a recognition of their existence played 
out in the effort to place the Third Estate alongside the First 
39 Sara Ahmed, Willful Subjects (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014).
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Estate of the church and the Second Estate of the aristocracy. 
On the eve of the Revolution, in the call for the forming of the 
Estates General in which all three estates would seek to be repre-
sented, Emmanuel Sieyès would raise the call: ‘What is the Third 
Estate? Everything. What, until now, has it been in the existing 
political order? Nothing. What does it want to be? Something’.40
This demand for existence runs through the history 
of the modern Left, hence the incredible power of the demand 
that ‘our work is work’.41 This involves a struggle over value in 
both the cultural and economic senses of the term, and the femi-
nist struggle over the value of work that issues from differently 
understood bodies is of immeasurable importance for Left politics 
today. The struggle over valuation has been understood by some 
as a ‘struggle for recognition’, an effort to have one’s contribution 
admitted, recognised, and valued.42 For others, it is a demand for 
equality grounded in the demand for a part for those who are con-
sidered to have ‘no part’.43 For others still, it is a demand for the 
right to appear for those whose pain, suffering, and even death 
are not considered worth grieving and for an effort to make life 
for these people more liveable.44
It can be useful to formalise such demands for existence 
in terms of a politics of ‘the count’.45 This involves the most rigor-
40 Emmanuel Sieyès, “What is the Third Estate?” in Political Writings (Indianapolis, 
IL: Hackett, 2003), 94. 
41 Federici, “Wages Against Housework,” 20.
42 See Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social 
Conflicts (Oxford: Polity, 1996); Axel Honneth, The I in We: Studies in the Theory 
of Recognition (Oxford: Polity, 2012); Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistri-
bution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (London: Verso, 2004).
43 Jacques Rancière, Politics of Aesthetics, trans. Gabriel Rockhill (London: Contin-
uum, 2006).
44 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2010), 
Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (Harvard, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2015).
45 See, for example, Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: 
Continuum, 2005).
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ous accounting for who is counted, and who is miscounted and 
discounted within the count. A counter-count can always be initi-
ated against the governing count: this demands the counting of 
all of those who exist. In this sense, a politics of the count and 
of the counter-count always contests the present miscount and 
discount and presses towards a different count. A politics of the 
count demands that the current exclusions and marginalisations 
be accounted for, and it is oriented towards an alternative future 
or a counterfuture.
A Left politics of the count regarding work contests the 
current miscounting and discounting of certain types of work 
and demands an expansion of the count. This runs through Left 
demands for the revaluation of diverse types of work, and for the 
inclusion of activities previously unrecognised as work, such as 
reproduction and care work, as equally deserving of recognition 
and inclusion in reward as other forms of ‘work’. In short, the 
Left ontologically redefines the nature of work in ways that are 
more extensive, expansive, and inclusive, including in its defini-
tion of work a range of forms of unpaid work that continue to go 
unrecognised or under-recognised.
An expanded or, better, no longer restricted count there-
fore demands recognition of the relative equality of work across 
all of its forms. Recognising the activity of all is the ground for 
the rejection of the extensive differentiation in the value attrib-
uted to various types of activity. Recognition of the value of all 
and the connections, interrelationships, and interdependencies 
between diverse activities in a complex global economy is the 
solid ground on which rests the demand for redistribution of col-
lectively produced wealth.
Since the Left departs from the Right on the question of 
what exists as work and what activities count, the Left comes to 
very different conclusions about what social arrangements are 
justifiable. It also departs on the question of where work issues 
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from. For the Right, work issues above all from the most obvious 
and immediate appearance of the source of activity in the action 
of an individual. For the Left, that act is profoundly enabled 
by the place of that individual actor in a social context. For the 
Left, both the immediate action and the actor themself are fully 
socially embedded. The human being ‘is at all events a social 
animal’.46  It is constituted through interactions with others, and 
its actions impact upon others in turn. Recognition of the social 
enablement and implication of action decentres the individual 
with respect to reward.
It might seem at this point that ultimately the Left 
does value work more highly than the Right. But what I want 
to stress is that it values something different. The Left identifies 
and includes as valuable something that the Right also values, 
but the Right only values this as something to pillage.
My proposal is that this kind of thinking can ground 
positions for a project of the future of work for the Left. Without 
this historical memory, the Left risks uncritically taking on the 
concept of work from the Right. On that conception, what work is 
and what the value of work is, is nothing more than the present 
and contingent valuation of human meat on the labour market. 
Work is then only valued according to its value to capital and its 
agents, mediated by the laws of supply and demand, which is to 
say, by the current state of the class struggle. A Left project will, 
as it always has, refuse that basis of valuation and insist instead 
upon the uniquely human capacity for deliberation on what is, 
and the worth of what is.
The future of work is often portrayed as if resulting from 
an inexorable process of technological change that is outside of 
collective social deliberation. This is why, along with reconsider-
ing the nature of what work is, any effective Left politics recog-
46 Marx, Capital, Volume One, 444.
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nises that work is the way it is for social and political reasons. 
This means that it can be changed. Such is the radical nature 
of the Future of Work Commission when it stresses that ‘The 
fundamental premise of our Commission is that the future of 
work is not predestined, and it can be guided by our policies and 
our priorities’,47 and that ‘The future of work will be guided and 
shaped by the choices and decisions we make’.48
Conclusion: Five positions for a Left politics of work
Initiatives such as the Future of Work Commission present a 
significant opportunity. It signals that work is being recognised, 
once again, as an important consideration for the parliamenta-
ry Left, and this comes at a time in which new forms of politi-
cal organisation and new Left political organisations are arising 
here and globally.49 But nothing is to be gained from the strategy 
deployed by the institutional Left for too long now, that of imi-
tating in a far from convincing form, moderated only by damage 
control after the fact, the politics, categories, concerns, and con-
cepts of the Right. As the Left arises from the ashes today, in a 
process that contains no glimpse of magic nor of naïve hopeful-
ness but rather faces up to the hard work ahead, we can be for-
tified in knowing that when we launch a politics of work there 
are already key elements in the tradition of the Left which have 
maintained a very specific understanding of the nature of work.
What can be claimed politically depends on what is and 
in vital ways on what appears. To say that the form of appear-
47 Future of Work Commission, The Future of Work, 7.
48 Future of Work Commission, The Future of Work, 5.
49 Jones and Walsh, “What is political organisation,” 1-6.
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ance of what appears is vitally important is not to say that every-
thing is appearance. Far from it. It is rather a principled calling 
into question of the self-evidence of how things appear. A Left 
politics of work involves making what is appear; this requires a 
critical moment that contests the narrowness of what appears as 
work. This critical and oppositional moment stresses the political 
consequences of both miscounting and discounting work.
What I call the ‘vulgar concept of work’ sees work only 
in the material exertion of effort that issues from an individual 
in return for a wage; it results from a historically and cultur-
ally specific idea of what work is and of what a person is. The 
vulgar concept of work is so improbable that it is rarely main-
tained in any consistent way, even by those who actively cham-
pion it. Organised and outright contestation of the vulgar concept 
of work provides at least five positions regarding the nature of 
work. Briefly enumerating these by way of conclusion might help 
to bring together the various threads of the analysis so far and 
clarify the grounds on which a Left politics of work could be built.
First, work is very different for the Left than it is for 
the Right. For the Left, work is much more and involves much 
more than is currently recognised as work. There are concrete 
political reasons capital seeks to pay as little as possible for 
our work. If our work can be completely miscounted, not seen 
to be creating value at all, while it produces and reproduces 
the conditions of life and indeed life itself, so much the bet-
ter for the capitalist class. If our work can be discounted, paid 
less than the value it creates, then that class might grudgingly 
pay, cutting corners at every turn, and after doing so, it will 
want to be celebrated for having created jobs, and will assert 
that is them and their ingenious innovations, rather than our 
work, that creates wealth. We have a different count of who 
and what counts, a counter-count, and with this a vision of a 
counterfuture.
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Second, while the vulgar concept of work emphasises 
the most immediate aspects of work, we maintain that the action 
of any individual human being is mediated by the previous work 
of others. This previous work of other people has created a vast 
and truly collective social capital which provides the basis for 
our present capacities for work and its immense productivity. 
This previous work, this dead labour that enables living labour, 
is manifest in our daily work and is represented by the Right as 
wealth and as capital. It is the basis for the expanded production 
of wealth and we all have a crucial stake in it. But this previous 
work of others and the benefits that accrue from it are monopo-
lised by an incredibly small group of people, to the point that at 
the time of writing eight individuals currently command as much 
wealth as the poorest half of Earth’s inhabitants.50 Against this, 
a Left politics of work begins from the fact that this wealth does 
not rightfully belong to those individuals. This wealth and what 
it enables was not produced by those who command it and we all, 
by right, have a share in it.
Third, while the vulgar concept of work maintains that 
work issues primarily from the agency of an individual, we main-
tain that work is decentred in relation to the individual. In the 
immediate act of working, what a seemingly individual body 
exerts is the working through and working out of a vast social-
ity. This becomes visible in certain forms of affective and care 
work; more importantly, the analysis of these forms of work dem-
onstrates the universality of this decentring of the locus of work 
away from the individual. This is what lies behind the insistence 
that production today is from the common, in common, of the com-
mon. This sense of enablement by others stresses what is called a 
positive freedom, a freedom that the Right does not acknowledge 
50 Oxfam, ‘An economy for the 99%’. Last accessed 21 July 2017. https://www.oxfam.
org/en/research/economy-99
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or admit.51 Note also that in redistributing agency away from the 
individual, the Left redistributes what appears as work and what 
enables work. This is why meritocracy looks very different on the 
Left. For us, meritocracy requires recognition of the activities of 
all who have enabled the creation of our common wealth.
Fourth, while the vulgar concept of work principally rec-
ognises activities that are able to secure a wage, we maintain 
that the actual contribution of work runs a different course than 
what is credited by the wage. This includes, first of all, a politics of 
unpaid work: that work of others that is valued at precisely noth-
ing even while it is the indispensable condition of economic life 
and of paid labour. This involves crediting that work of the pro-
duction and reproduction of those who enter paid employment, 
crediting it as the origin and ground of social life, and refusing 
the idea that production and reproduction of life is worth nothing 
or merely follows from the nature of certain bodies. It also brings 
into play a recognition of the work of those preparing themselves 
for work through education, the work of those recovering from a 
day or a lifetime of work, and the work of those arbitrarily thrown 
out of work who are transitioning into new or different jobs. It 
includes the work of time, the work of cultivation, preservation, 
and repair of the natural environment, activities that are, for the 
vulgar concept of work, nothing but externalities.
Fifth, while the vulgar concept of work lets work appear 
in relation to its ability to secure individual material and symbolic 
reward, we maintain the relative equality of all forms of work. We 
have learned from bitter experience that paid work is paid not in 
relation to its productivity but in relation to the capacity for col-
lective demands. We know that there is no evidence that wages 
rise automatically with economic growth, and that the period in 
which work and reward have approximated each other was his-
51 Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge, 1960), 18.
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torically brief, produced by a power that capital seeks always to 
outmanoeuvre.52 We know that the share of national and global 
output accruing to capital and to labour can vary remarkably 
over time, following a cycle that is political and representational, 
not the mechanical result of economic productivity or growth.53 
We know that international labour arbitrage across differences 
in wages of immobile workforces is the basis for surplus profits 
achieved through outsourcing. We know that the distribution of 
material and symbolic rewards reflects the capacity to appear 
as productive, as working. Our demand for the relative equal-
ity of all forms of work is a struggle against the discounting of 
certain workers to the benefit of others, and our historic and pre-
sent demand for high progressive income taxes reflects the need 
for political action against the inequities of distribution that are 
inherent to the capitalist organisation of work on labour markets.
Together, these positions offer the grounds for a Left 
politics of work, which would insist: (1) that work is much more 
and involves much more than is currently recognised as work; 
(2) that the action of any individual is mediated by the previous 
work of others; (3) that work is decentred in relation to the indi-
vidual; (4) that the actual contribution of work runs a different 
course than what is credited by the wage; and (5) on the rela-
tive equality of all forms of work. In building on this tradition of 
52 International Labour Organisation, World Employment Social Outlook: Trends 
2017 (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2017).
53 The Future of Work Commission notes a fall in the labour share in economic 
growth from 50% to 37% between 2009 and 2015 (Future of Work Commission, 
The Future of Work, p. 9). Even the right think tank the Productivity Commission 
notes that among the predominant reasons for the fall in the share of national 
income going to labour over the past thirty years has been ‘decreases in labour’s 
bargaining power’, and that ‘changes in policies and institutions over the past 
thirty years have altered the balance of bargaining power across the owners of 
labour and capital’. Paul Conway, Lisa Meehan and Dean Parham, “Who Ben-
efits from Productivity Growth? The Labour Income Share in New Zealand,” New 
Zealand Productivity Commission Working Paper, 2015. See also, for example, 
Benjamin Bridgman and Ryan Greenaway-McGrevy “The fall (and rise) of labour 
share in New Zealand,” New Zealand Economic Papers (2016): 1-22.
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the Left, nothing that has been said here should indicate looking 
backwards other than to remember and to learn from the past. In 
this sense, the other thing that the Left has always maintained is 
an orientation towards the future. If we speak of tax today, then, 
it will be to demand taxes on wealth, it will be to return wealth 
to those who have actually produced it in their work. And when 
we demand a social wage or massive reorientations to projects 
of housing, transport, health, and education, this is in recogni-
tion that need must inform distribution; again, this is because 
we refuse the miscounting and discounting of the work that pro-
duced our ability to provide these things in the first place.
A viable Left future will not come about through making 
adjustments to the present; it must be actively and creatively con-
structed. The future is not produced by robots, technology, or any 
automatic economic trajectory. Creating a Left future requires 
political organisation and strategic thinking. This thinking will 
take us beyond the most obvious politics of the existing parlia-
mentary and extra-parliamentary Left.
Work is vital to any politics of the future. We must have 
the confidence to make visible both the history and the present 
of what we are doing as work. Because for us on the Left, work 
is something fundamentally different than it is for those on the 
Right. We might now sense why the Right wants to force the 
concept of work back into its narrowest confines. If the Right has 
been more alert to how explosive work can be as a political con-
cept and has strenuously sought to constrain it, it is our turn to 
reclaim work and everything that it involves.
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